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FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ASIA'S 
CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
The 2008 financial crisis led to the most serious global recession since the 1930s 
(Krugman 2009). The crisis originated in the United States, with its origin in the 
excess in the US housing and mortgage markets. Persistent high unemployment 
and declining personal net worth contributed to Americans' sense of insecurity 
and turned their attention inward: reorg.inizing dysfunctional financial institutions, 
revitalizing the economy, adopting a more ~autious foreign policy, and locking in 
presidential election-year politicking. Beginning in 2011, several European coun-
tries became afflicted with economic crises, threatening the cohesiveness and via-
bility of the euro zone. While traditional American and European powerhouses are 
grappling with the aftermath of what has become known as the Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC), several large developing countries - the so-called BRlCS - have 
experienced sustained rapid economic growth, devoted considerable resources to 
developing their military capabilities, expanded their influence in their neighbor-
hoods, and become more vocal on global governance. China's "rise" (or "second 
rise," or "resurgence") amidst the CFC has been especially noteworthy: its suc-
cessful hosting of the 2008 Olympics, its economy serving as the new engine of 
growth, its increasingly assertive posture in the maritime territorial disputes in East 
Asia, the allure of the so-called "Beijing Consensus," etc. While the various major 
international players' variegated fortunes are still unfolding and being sorted out, 
the CFC is shaping up as a geopolitical as well as a geoeconomic event - par-
ticularly in Asia, an economically dynamic region where America's staying power 
and China's growing aspirations intersect. Does the GFC help alter the balance of 
power in Asia? 
Students of international relations have tended to pay more attention to the 
effects that crucial long-term trends have on the changing balance of power than 
short-term events. Some have characterized the history of world politics as a "suc-
cession of hegemonies" (Gilpin 1981 ), as a series of" long cycles" (Modelski 1978), 
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or as the recurrent "rise and decline of the great powers" (Kennedy 1987). Others 
have focused on the long-term impact of discontinuous events, such as revolution-
ary technological changes, that provide the "creative destruction" fundamentally 
altering the course of world history (Schumpeter 1962). 
In contrast, short-term, episodic, and disruptive events, such as financial crises, 
have not received an equal amount of attention by scholars of international rela-
tions. This might be for three main reasons. First, some analysts view financial crises 
as inevitable outcomes of the normal business cycles of capitalism. Hence, they are 
unlikely to fundamentally change the balance of power in the international system. 
Joseph Nye judicious cautions: "One should be wary, however, of extrapolating 
long-term trends from cyclical events, while being aware of misleading metaphors 
of organic decline (2011: 143). Second, some writers recognize financial crises 
as contemporaneous with certain aspects of globalization, such as growing inter-
dependence and pro-market liberalization, but nonetheless point out that most 
of the financial crises since the early 1970s have either originated in or mainly 
afHicted developing countries, not developed countries, implying that only less 
developed forms of capitalism (as seen in developing countries) are susceptible to 
financial crises, whereas more developed (or better-regulated) capitalist systems as 
seen in developed countries are more "immune" to such disruptions. That is, until 
the 2008-9 financial crisis. Some scholars attribute this to asymmetric depend-
ence - that is, developing countries depend more on developed countries and are 
thus more vulnerable to problems arising from interdependence, such as financial 
crises. Some thinkers even suggest that manipulation of such asymmetric depend-
ence constitutes a source of power. Third, there are those concerned about the 
geostrategic consequences of financial crises who argue that notwi~hstanding the 
losses suffered by the developing countries, developed countries often "gain" from 
these financial crises in that the wrecked developing countries become even more 
dependent upon the developed countries and the relative power gap between the 
two groups widens, not narrows. One good example of this assessment are the rela-
tive gains and losses of Japan, China, and the United States in the aftermath of the 
1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis. The conventional wisdom on that crisis is "China 
went up, Japan went down, and the United States increased its relative power vis-
a-vis major Asian economies" (Zoellick and Zelikow 2000). Since the previously 
dominant powers become even more dominant, there is not much point in study-
ing the long-term impacts of financial crises, because these events do not alter the 
"fundamentals" and usually "benefit" the already dominant players. 
However, thanks to globalization, technological innovation, increased cross-
border financial flows, and pro-liberalization policies, financial crises have become 
more frequent, widespread, and fickle. In other words, they have become more 
"normal." Although they still afHict emerging markets more frequently and ser-
iously, industrialized nations are hardly inunune from them.1 Scholars increasingly 
acknowledge that financial crises can pose dilemmas for global governance, 2 cause 
human suffering,3 and produce geopolitical and strategic externalities (Tellis et al. 
2009; Gill 1999). Attention should also be paid to the impact of financial crises 
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on the changing balance of power in the international system, particularly those 
long-term or fundamental shifts triggered by "short-term" events. The impact of 
supposedly short-term disruptions can be so large that it sets in long-term or even 
irreversible trends. 
Unlike the previous crises, which often originated in or mostly afflicted devel-
oping countries, the 2008 GFC originated in the United States, with its origin 
in the excess in the US housing and mortgage markets, and led to the most ser-
ious global recession since the 1930s (Krugman 2009; Kubarych 2009).As Richard 
Ellings points out, for Asian countries "submitting to and investing in the US-led 
regime has historically yielded dependable stability and prosperity" (2009:x).To use 
the typology developed in the Introduction to this volume, US leadership in the 
Asia-Pacific since the end ofWorld War II has depended on both relational power 
and structural power (Strange 1988), has been manifested in all three faces (first, 
second, and third), and has combined hard and soft power (Nye 1990, 2011). The 
2008 GFC weakened not only America's capacity to continue delivering economic 
prosperity for Asian states, but also its attraction in the eyes of some Asian states. 
Have these changes been so noticeable or perceived to be so fundamental that they 
help shape the basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences of Asian states? Or to use 
a now familiar formulation, has the GFC affected US "power to" or "power over" 
regarding Asia? Was the Obama administration's declaration that the United States 
"is back in Asia" a response to this perceived power shift? Does the United States 
have (or is it perceived to have) the econou~ic capabilities to support its "pivot" or 
"strategic rebalancing" to Asia? All this occurred against the backdrop of American 
military engagement abroad and economic weaknesses at home, China's ascend-
ance in East Asia, and Japan's persistent malaise. The 2008 GFC thus coincided 
with the relative rise of the. so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) - large, fast-growing emerging powers seeking to play greater roles in global 
affairs, and the relative decline of those industrial powers that had dominated inter-
national affairs since the end ofWorld War II, such as the USA, Japan, and Europe. 
Will the cumulative effects of the two financial crises (1997-99 and 2008-9) within 
roughly one decade augur important shifts (real or perceived) in the balance of 
power in East Asia? 
This study examines the impact of the 2008 GFC on the changing power in 
East Asia. It examines three key questions: How has the crisis affected each major 
power in the region? How have those countries that gained (in relative terms) from 
the crisis translated their new power into greater influence and attraction? How 
will short-term changes affect long-term trends? It addresses the meaning, sources, 
and limits of power. 
Measuring power 
Studying the impact of the 2008 GFC on Asia's changing balance of power 
encounters two issues. The first is how to measure the dependent variable: power. 
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The second is how to isolate the effect of the 2008 GFC from the multitude of 
independent variables that have an effect on the dependent variable. In terms of 
measuring power, many have been grappling with developing more satisfactory 
empirical measures (e.g. the chapter by Chiu and Willet in this volume). I will not 
reinvent the wheel, but use several existing (admittedly imperfect) measures to 
make one simple point, that the 2008 GFC has contributed to a relative decline of 
the United States vis-a-vis China. 
The conventional "national power" approach identifies tangible resources and 
defines power as capabilities.At the most "parsimonious" (and arguably simplistic) 
end, some scholars compare GDP (gross domestic product) data at a given time and 
over time. After all, economic resources can translate into many elements of power, 
such as military power and the quality of the population. Relying on GDP alone, 
naturally, is very crude and can be misleading. Yet, it can serve as a useful first step. 
Table 2.1 provides a snapshot of the GDP figures of the USA, Japan, EU, and several 
fast-growing large developing countries. I will elaborate on the "rise of BRICS" 
later. 
In the same vein, the classic standard-bearer of quantitative IR research - the 
Correlates ofWar (COW) project - develops a Composite Indicator of National 
Capability (CINC) consisting of six indicators - military expenditure, military per-
sonnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total 
population. Unfortunately, COW's relevant data cover the period from 1816 to 
2007.4 The post-2008 data are expected to be included, but there may be a lapse of 
several years. Nonetheless, the pre-2008 data can still shed some light by providing 
a baseline and discerning trends. Table 2.2 shows the CINCs of several key Asian 
states from 2001 to 2007 - the latest year for which data are available. 
This table shows that US CINC had remained around 14 percent of the world's 
total (as the CINC is calculated). China's CINC increased from 15.85 percent in 
2001 to 19.86 percent in 2007. So, by this measure, China's CINC was already 
higher than that of the United States prior to the onset of the 2008 GFC. The post-
2008 developments (see below) can only be reasonably assumed to accentuate these 
trends. India's CINC also increased - to over 7 percent. By contrast, Japan's and 
Russia's CINCs declined.5 
If measures such as CINC can be faulted as Western-centric, we should also 
look at non-Western indicators. Chinese strategic thinkers have developed a meas-
ure called Comprehensive National Power (CNP, zonghe guoli), which they claim 
is an indigenous and scientific measure for comparing China's CNP against those 
of major powers at a given time and tracking changes in China's CNP over time 
(Pillsbury 2000). 
Table 2.3 shows the components that contribute to CNP and their respect-
ive weights. It should be noted that CNP consists of both tangible and intangible 
elements, unlike CINC, which includes only tangible elements.Table 2.4 shows the 
CNP comparisons over time. By one estimate posited well before 2008, by 2020, 
China's CNP will virtually match that of the United States. 
TABLE 2.1 Emerging versus established great powers: select indicators 
Chi11,1 Iudi11 Bmzil Russi11 USA }1p1!1/ EU 
GDP (ppp, $,world rank) $12.38 t, $4.73t, $2.36t, $2.51 t, $15.66 t, $4.62 t, $15.70t 
in 2012 2nd 3rd 7th 6th 1st 4th 
GDP (official exchange $8.25 t, $ 1.95t, $2.43 t, $1.95t, $15.66t, $5.98t, $16.19t 
rate $,world rank) in 2nd 10th 7th 9th 1st 3rd 
2012 
GDP per capita (ppp, $, $9,100, $3,900, $12,000, $17,700, $49,800, $36,200, $34,500 
world rank) in 2012 96th 135th 82th 57th 9th 27th 
GDP per capita (nominal, $6,200, $1,500, $12, 100, $13,800, $49,900. $47,000, $31,700 
2012) 87th 146th 57th 51st 15th 18th 
GDP real growth rate, 7.8%, 5.4%, 1.3%, 3.6'){,, 2.2'){,, 2.2%, n/a 
2012 (world rank) 16th 50th 155th 96th 138th 137th 
GDP real growth rate, 10.3%, 10.4%, 7.5%, 4%, 2.8%, 3.9%, n/a 
2010 (world rank) 6th 5th 31st 92nd 116th 93rd 
GDP average annual 13.34% 7.63% 6.12% 4.92% 5.27% 2.21% n/a 
growth rate 
(1990-2007) 
Population (number, 1,343m, 1,205 m, 199 m, 142m, 313111, 127 m, 492 m 
world rank) in 2012 1st 2nd 5th 9th 3rd 10th 
Trade volume ($ billion, 3,801 809 495 900 3,969 1,650 4,567 
2012) 
Exports ($,world rank) $2,021 b, $309b, $256b, $542b, $1,612b, $793b, $2,170b 
in 2010 1st 17th 23rd 8th 2nd 4th 
TABLE 2.1 (cont.) 
China fodia Br11zil Russ iii USA J.1p1111 EU 
Imports ($,world rank) $1,780b, $500b, $239b, $358b, $2,357b, $857b, $2,397b 
in 2010 2nd 8th 21st 15th 1st 4th (2007) 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 3,549, 287, 371, 561, 148, 1,351, n/a 
($ billion, rank) (2012 1st 9th 5th 3rd 16th 2nd 
end, est.) 
Military spending ($ billion, 98.Sb, 36.6b, 27.1 b, 61.0b, 663b, 46.9b, n/a 
world rank) 2008 2nd 10th 12th 5th 1st 7th 
Defense expenditure (% 4.3% in 2006 2.5% in 2006 1.7% in 2009 3.9% in 2005 4.06% in 2006 0.8% in 2006 n/a 
GDP) 
Internet users (world rank) 389m, 61.3m, 75.9111, 40.9m, 245m, 99.2111, 247 m 
in 2009 1st 6th 4th 10 2nd 3rd 
Percentage of global 16.36%, 4.25%, 6.47%, 4.58%, 15.74%, 3.17%, 12.08%, 
emission of greenhouse 1st 7th 4th 6th 2nd 8th 3rd 
gases, 2005, rank 
m, million; b, billion, t, trillion 
S111me:Author's compilation of data from CIA, W<1rld Factl>Mk: 2011, 2012. 
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TABLE 2.2 Composite indicator of national capability (2001-2007) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
United 0.1420 0.1435 0.1421 0.1432 0.1483 0.1464 0.1421 
States 
Russia 0.0514 0.0476 0.0473 0.0455 0.0391 0.0393 0.0393 
China 0.1585 0.1674 0.1692 0.1826 0.1839 0.1903 0.1986 
Japan 0.0516 0.0512 O.lH91 0.0473 0.0462 0.0441 0.0427 
India 0.0691 0.0693 0.0685 0.0700 0.0712 0.0725 0.0734 
S1•urces: Compiled from CorreLues ofWar Pro jeer, N.1tional Material Capabilities (v. 4.0) dataset, 
http://corrdatesolwar.org/.Accessed 1 M.1rch 2012. 
TABLE 2.3 Weighted coefficients of major component factors 
Total CNP 
Natural resources 
Economic activities capability 
Foreign economic activities capability 
Scientific and technological capability 
Social development level 
Military capability 
Government regulation and control capability 
Foreign atl:airs capability 
S,i11m·:Waug 1996: 169. 
1.00 
0.08 
0.28 
0.13 
0.15 
0.10 
0.10 
0.08 
0.08 
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The main problem with CNP is tlut it is very hard to find comprehensive and 
consistent comparisons.6 Even with these caveats, the general patterns of China 
gradually catching up with the USA still hold true. 
Of course, one of the most common and well-advised warnings is against 
extrapolation based on a small set of (most recent) data. So, it is reasonable to ques-
tion whether China's economy can continue growing at the 9 percent range as it 
has for the past 25 years. However, prominent economists, such as former World 
Bank Vice-President and Chief Economist Justin Lin (2011), believe that by better 
utilizing their unused resources and improving productivity, China's economy (and 
to a lesser extent, India's) has room for 8-9 percent annual growth for the next 20 
or 30 years. So these projections are not completely baseless. 
The rise of the BRICS 
The ramifications of the 2008 GFC should be examined in conjunction with one 
other significant development in international relations: the rise of the BRICS. 
TABLE 2.4 CNP scores and ranks over time (as a percentage of US CNP by year, US= 100) [m11k) 
Country 1970 1980 1989190 2000 2010 2020 
CASS CASS Huang CASS Huang CASS Huang CASS Huang CASS 
USA 100 [1] 100 [1} 100 £1 J 100 [1} 100 [1} 100 [1} 100 [1] 100 [1] 100 [1] 100 [2] 
China 25 [9] 33 [8] 37 [6) 34 [8] 53 [5} 42 [7] 72 [3} 52 [7] 97 [2] 61 [5] 
Germany 42 [3] 52 [3] 64 [3] 58 [3] 68 [3] 67 [3] 72 [2] 77 [3] 77 {3] 85 [3] 
Japan 34 [4] 50{4] 62 {4] 58 [3] 66 {4] 76 [2] 69 [4] 97 [2] 73 [4} 119 [1) 
India 15 [10] 19 [10] 24 £9) 18 [10] 34 [8) 22 [10] 44 {6} 26 [10] 57 £5) 30 [10] 
France 33 [6) 46 [5] 47 [5] 46 [5] 47 {6} 59 £4] 48 [5] 70 [4] 48 [6] 82 [4] 
Brazil - - 26 [8] - 33 £9) - 39 [7) - 47 [7) 
England 34 (4] 42 [6] 36 (7) 42 [6] 34 {7] 48 £6] 33 {8] 54 [6] 32 [8] 60 [6] 
Canada 33 [6] 35 [7] 23 [10] 36 [7] 22 [10] 38 [8] 21 £9) 40 [8) 20 [9] 42 [8) 
Australia 26 [8] 29 [9) 19 [11] 28 [9) 18 [11] 29 £9) 17 [10] 31 [9] 17 [10] 32 [9] 
USSR 64 [2) 77 [2] 65 £2] 66 [2] 79[2] 
Russia - - - (50) - 54 [5) - 57 [5) - 56 [7] 
Sources: The scores for 1989 and 2000 are from Huang 1992: 220-21. 
Notes: Scores for 2010 and 2020 were generated by Pillsbury. This table combines Tables 9 aud 10. in Pillsbury (2000: 248-49). Huang = projections to 2020 of AMS 
(Academy of Military Science) GNP statistics. CASS= Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Ranks for the 1970 and 1980 scores contain ties, because Pillsbury provided 
only percentages (of US CNP) for those years; actual CNP scores were provided for later years. 
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Table 2.1 provides empirical validation of the rise of the BRICS vis-a-vis trad-
itional economic powerhouses such as the USA,Japan, and Europe. 
Measured in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms, as of2012, China's economy 
($12.4 trillion) was already the second largest in the world - having surpassed Japan 
and reaching about 79 percent of the United States ($15.7 trillion). India's economy 
($4. 7 trillion) had also leapt to third place, edging out Japan ($4.6 trillion). Measured 
in official exchange rates, BRICS economies are more modest, but China remains 
number two ($8.3 trillion, or about 53 percent of the United States). 
What is more important is the differential rates of growth: For the 1990--
2007 period, China's economy grew at an annual rate of 13.34 percent (India 
7 .63 percent, Brazil 6.12 percent), compared to the USA's 5.27 percent and Japan's 
2.21 percent. Data for 2008-12 show that the pattern observed above - BRICS 
grow much faster and consistently than the USA,Japan, and Europe - held and 
indeed became even more pronounced, as can be seen in the huge contrast in their 
respective annual growth rates in recent years (the table contrasts data for 2010 
and 2012). 
According to International Monetary Fund data, the honor of "engine of 
growth" for the global economy (measured by countries contributing to the largest 
incremental GDP) passed from the United States to China around 2005-6 (in PPP 
terms) or 2006-7 (in nominal terms) (IMF 2012). Given the continued differential 
rates of growth since 2008, the trend that began with the changeover is expected 
to continue. Since the power and the attraction of the USA since World War 11 had 
been bolstered by its economic power, if the current trend continues unabated, it 
will erode US power and standing in the world. 
We also know that China and India, albeit not immune from the 2008 CFC, 
were less affected than the USA and other Asian states and recovered much faster. 
Although the recession in the USA and Europe caused massive layoffs in Chinese 
export firms, China was able to fend off the recession by domestic fiscal and mon-
etary policies. Pieter Botte!ier explains: 
China's strong fiscal situation, low leverage, and relatively strong banks left ample 
room ... for aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus to beat out the recession. 
China is emerging from the crisis sooner than any other large economy, and 
the crisis will probably accelerate China's rise and expand China's global lead-
ership role in the economic and financial areas (Bottelier 2009: 71). 
Hence, in a.~r~{!utc terms, China's economy will almost assuredly surpass America's 
sometime in the fi.1ture. Difierent estimates put the date as early as 2018 or as late 
as 2035 - given the current trends. What implications that has is unclear and will 
probably be debated for quite some time, but it will mark the first time in more 
than 200 years that the leading economy is a non-Western power. 
Table 2.5 uses the more "conservative" measure - GDP in current dollars (otfi-
cial exchange rates). By this measure, China's economy is expected to eclipse that 
of the US economy by 2030. 
TABLE 2.5 GDP trends of major Asian-Pacific countries 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010e 2011e 2012e 2013e 2014e 2015e 2015* 2030* 2050* 
China 2,713 3,494 4,520 4,991 5,878 6,516 7,209 8,057 9,016 10,061 8,133 25,610 70,710 
Japan 4,363 4,378 4,880 5,033 5,458 5,821 5,921 6,058 6,218 6,380 4,861 5,814 6,677 
USA 13,399 14,062 14,369 14, 119 14,658 15,227 15,880 16,522 17,223 17,993 16,194 22,817 38,514 
India 908 1,152 1,259 1,269 1,538 1,704 1,859 2,061 2,280 2,516 1,900 6,683 37,668 
South 952 1,049 931 832 1,007 1,126 1,201 1,282 1,376 1,475 1,305 2,241 4,083 
Korea 
Taiwan 376 393 400 377 431 504 545 591 639 692 
5,,ur<"es: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database,April 2011 edition; Goldman Sachs . 
• '\/Mes: 
1 Data for 2006-9 are in current prices billions US dollars. 
2 Data for 2010e-2015e are estimates in current prices billions US dollars. 
3 Data for 2015*-2050* are estimates in 2006 billions US dollars. 
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The different fortunes unleashed by the 2008 GFC - China's rise in both abso-
lute and relative terms - will undoubtedly fortify these trends. However, even when 
China's economy catches with up that of the USA (i.e. China's per capita GDP 
reaches about one quarter of America's), other factors should be considered. The 
compositio11 of the two economies will still be quite different: China will still be a 
more agrarian, developing economy with lower productivity, although its citizens 
will unquestionably have become wealthier and more productive than today. 
Although size is not everything, China's larger size does require a more nuanced 
analysis over the implications of China's growing size for the various meanings of 
power. 
Nye (2011) distinguishes between power defined as resources and power defined 
as behavioral outcomes (inducing preferred outcomes through coercion, reward, 
and attraction). While many people begin and end with the resource concept of 
power, because it is "easier" to track the resources trends among the leading coun-
tries (as do Table 2.1 and Table 2.5), deploying resources does not guarantee the 
preferred outcomes. The conversion requires what Nye calls "smart power" com-
bining well-designed strategies and skillful leadership (2011: 8). Power is not always 
fungible, as other authors of this volume show. Given the observed resources gaps, 
outcomes cannot be predicted a priori. 
The Introduction to this volume distinguishes the external and internal dimen-
sions of power and cogently points out that while a state's growing power may 
enhance its mitonomy (or capacity to resist taking orders from the reigning dom-
inant hegemon), it may not necessarily translate into greater i1!fiumre (to shape 
the structure or rules for others to follow). Whereas it is reasonable to argue that 
increased resource or capabilities help enhance the autonomy aspect of power, cct-
cris paribus, whether they contribute to a commensurate increase of the influence 
aspect of power depends on context-specific analysis. As a result of their expand-
ing resource base, growing capabilities, and faster growth rates, certain states (e.g. 
China and India) have increased their autonomy. The 2008 GFC has hurt the 
USA more and has thus narrowed the gaps between the reigning hegemon and 
the BRICS, which used to only take orders from the hegemon. BRICS now push 
back on certain issues important to their interests (e.g. global climate change, 
world trade, and economic development).They were also immediately included in 
the C20, an expanded group of major economies of the world cobbled together 
on the heels of the CFC. While they have not replaced the USA to become the 
major rule-setter, they are no longer just rule-takers. They also participate in rule-
setting in some cases, in that without their participation, global governance is 
impossible. All this suggests the CFC has helped BRICS enhance their autonomy 
vis-a-vis the dominant West. But their influence on IPE global governance has not 
increased commensur<1bly, as they do not yet play the decisive decision-making 
role. Therefore, the relative economic performance of traditional powerhouses, 
such as the USA and the EU, vis-a-vis East Asia implies that leadership of IPE has 
become more diffuse. The rise of the BRICS, particularly China and India, will 
perpetuate that trend, and the 2008 CFC may well he a watershed. The formation 
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of G20 symbolized this more diffuse leadership. However, the era of Pax Americana 
is not yet over.7 Each ascending developing giant has its own weaknesses, which 
limits the influence they can play on the world stage. Further, even members of 
the BIRCS question the intra-group cohesiveness ofBRICs. ProfessorWangJisi, 
Dean of School oflnternational Relations of Peking University, opines:"The rise 
of the BRICs undoubtedly lessens the pressure China faces from the West. But 
most emerging countries have national interests and ideologies that differ greatly 
from China's" (2012). 
In addition to China's and India's growing global economic prominence, their 
elevated standing within the Asia-Pacific region is no less, and perhaps more, import-
ant. They play increasingly important roles in regional affairs and their voices are 
heard and often heeded. In East Asia, where the Cold War has not truly ended and 
where major economic powerhouses with historical enmity have now obtained 
the means and resources to turn into military assets, one significant externality is an 
arms race that correlates with relative economic performances. China's impressive 
military modernization benefitted from its economic growth and is exacerbating 
the unease and concern of its neighbors, such as Japan. The 2008 GFC helped ele-
vate China's standing in East Asian affairs. Countries in the region are increasingly 
beholden to China's interests and strategies (e.g. over South China Sea and Asian 
regional integration). Professor Yan Xuetong, a leading Chinese scholar at Tsing 
Hua University in Beijing, argues that for East Asia to become the center of world 
politics, it depends on China's rise (2012). 
Another externality of the GFC is that China's more impressive performance, 
fast-growing domestic market, and a coherent strategy have allo_wed it to pursue 
an assertive economic statecraft, leveraging a series of bilateral FTAs (free trade 
agreements) (Wang 2006) that often have an anti-American effect partly due to 
America's decidedly lower interest in signing bilateral FTAs with Asian countries 
(South Korea excepted). Leveraging China's fortuitous place in the regional pro-
duction network and its appealing domestic market, this strategy has allowed the 
country to replace the United States as the leading trade partners of traditional US 
trade partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. During the Cold War, trade 
flows followed geopolitical alignment. The changing trade patterns introduced a 
potential source of"schism" in the relationship between the USA and its traditional 
Asian allies and arguably diluted the USA's capacity to use economic incentives to 
extract political allegiance. Whether Taiwan's asymmetric dependence on China, 
despite the recent cross-strait reconciliation, will allow China to manipulate this 
relational power is especially interesting to observe. 
Having established the basic premise that the 2008 GFC has led to a changing 
balance of power in Asia by following conventional ("objective") conceptions of 
power (defined as resource) and acknowledging the shortcomings of this approach, 
I now examine the impact of the 2008 GFC on Asia's changing balance of power 
by exploring the subjective dimensions of power: specifically, how power is perceived 
by the general public in various countries and whether there has been a public per-
ception of such shifts as the result of the GFC. 
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Soft power: perceived versus real 
To help elucidate the power-as-influence dimension, this section suggests that we 
move beyond the resource-as-power approach and delve into the relational power 
or sofi:-power aspects. Nye defined soft power as the power to attract, or "the abil-
ity to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, 
and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes (Nye 2011: 
20-21). It will thus be interesting to examine whether countries such as China and 
India now enjoy greater admiration and whether their values and institutions have 
become more popular. Viewed in this light, it is questionable whether China's soft 
power has improved much vis-a-vis the United States (Nye 2010). The so-called 
Beijing Consensus (Halper 2012) may be appealing to some developing coun-
tries, but it is not clear that these states admire China's economic performance or 
its ideology. John Williamson, the original architect of the so-called Washington 
Consensus, maintains that the components of the Beijing Consensus - gradual-
ism, emphasis on innovation, reliance on foreign dem;md, state capitalism, and 
authoritarianism - is neither novel nor particularly attractive (2012). It is nei-
ther a coherent alternative model to Western capitalist democracy, nor a model 
the Chinese government actively promotes (Western journalists coined the term). 
China's continued relative better economic performance per se will not make it 
even more intellectually compelling, either. Although in recent years China has 
devoted considerable resources to promoting "soft power" concomitant with its 
growing economic power in the aftermath of the 2008 GFC (Huang 2013), even 
astute Chinese analysts conclude that China's overall image to the outside world 
remains unsatisfactory (Wang 2012).The 2008 GFC may have damaged the legit-
imacy and credibility of capitalism, but it does not augur its wholesale abandon-
ment. Rather, reform is called for. 
However, it is clear that BRICS, particularly China and India, will demand 
greater voice and more respect at institutions of global governance.A case in point 
is the 2009 proposal by China's Central Battle Governor Zhou Xiaochuan that 
the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) should eventually replace the dollar 
as the world's reserve currency (Zhou 2009). Scholar Barry Eichengreen opines 
that Zhou was engaged in symbolic politics, signaling China's "unhappiness with 
prevailing arrangements," whereas his real preferred alternative was establishing the 
Chinese currency, the remninbi, as an international currency so as to dilute the 
"exorbitant privilege" held by the dollar as the world's de facto reserve currency 
(Eichengreen 2011: 143). 
The 2008 CFC has made power more diffuse, but it has not occasioned a lead-
erless transition. The weakened West still has considerable soft power. However, if 
the prevailing trends discussed earlier continue much longer, it will be increasingly 
hard for the West to perpetuate its pre-eminent position in world affairs. 
Understanding the impact of the 2008 CFC requires an understanding of its 
context: the crisis began in and lasted longer in the USA, China was affected less 
by and emerged faster from the crisis, and the persistent differential rates of growth 
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would have implications for the changing power balance. It also occurred in the 
aftermath of America's decade-long military engagement in the Middle East. The 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2012:34) concludes:"China's influence is seen 
as rising in ten years as US influence lessens, though the influence of the United 
States is still seen as remaining ahead of China." 
To help understand how power transitions are perceived, I will provide an alter-
native and complementary angle to further explore the impact of the 2008 GFC: 
how the public in various countries perceive the relative changing of power after 
2008. I will show that this approach provides some empirical evidence for the per-
ceived changing balance of power. 
Whereas foreign policy is generally and ultimately the purview of elites, in many 
countries with open societies, public opinion also plays an important role, as deci-
sion-makers need to take into account the views of the general public. Whereas 
an in-depth analysis of elite opinions is outside the scope of this study, the analysis 
here seeks to shed some light by highlighting some interesting findings from sev-
eral important recent polls conducted by the Pew Research Center (2011, 2012a, 
2012b, 2013) and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2010, 2012) - the 2010 
and 2011 studies were conducted after the effects of the 2008 GFC had been fully 
felt (or"settled"), whereas the 2012 and 2013 studies continued tracking the devel-
opments and thus served to check against ephemeral findings. So, in a way, these 
polls can be seen as an imperfect but nonetheless illuminating psychological evalu-
ation of the changing balance of power after the 2008 GFC. 
Table 2.6 summarizes the responses of21 countries and one region in the 2011 
Pew Research to the question, "Will China replace the USA as the .world's leading 
superpower?" Twelve percent of Americans think China has already replaced the 
USA, and 34 percent say China will eventually replace the USA, a total of 46 per-
cent. An equal number of Americans (45 percent) think China will never replace 
the USA. By contrast, more Chinese (57 percent) are confident that China will 
replace the USA, and 6 percent of Chinese think that China has already replaced 
the USA as the world's leading superpower. Indians are ambivalent: fewer Indians 
believe overtaking will happen or has already occurred (32 percent), but also fewer 
Indians (17 percent) believe overtaking will never happen.Among America's allies, 
traditional European partners, such as France, Spain, Britain, and Germany, are more 
prone to believe in China overtaking the USA. The exception is Japan, which has 
the highest number of respondents that believe China will never replace the USA. 
The changing fortunes unleashed by the 2008 GFC appear to have led the public 
to perceive a changing power balance. 
A more recent poll by the Pew Research Center (2012b) further confirms this 
changing balance of economic power: 
Views about the economic balance of power have shifted dramatically over 
time among the 14 countries surveyed each year from 2008 to 2012. In 2008, 
before the onset of the global financial crisis, a median of 45 percent named 
the US as the world's leading economic power, while just 22 percent said 
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TABLE 2.6 Will China replace the USA as the world's leading superpower? 
H.1s 11/m1dy 111il/ eve11ru.1/ly 1iJt<1/ l1<1s or will Willnciw 
rep/.iced tlie USA repl.ice the USA rep/<1re the USA replace the USA 
% % % % 
USA 12 34 46 45 
France 23 49 72 28 
Spain 14 53 67 30 
Britain 11 54 65 26 
Germany 11 50 61 34 
Poland 21 26 47 31 
Russia 15 30 45 30 
Lithuania 11 29 40 40 
Ukraine 14 23 37 36 
Turkey 15 21 36 41 
Palestinian Terr. 17 37 54 38 
Jordan 17 30 47 45 
Israel 15 32 47 44 
Lebanon 15 24 39 54 
China 6 57 63 17 
Pakistan 10 47 57 10 
Japan 12 25 37 60 
Indonesia 8 25 33 46 
India 13 19 32 17 
Mexico 19 34 53 31 
Brazil 10 27 37 47 
Kenya 7 37 44 43 
Sourie: Compiled from Q28, Pew Research Center (2011: !) . 
.\/Me: Question not asked in Egypt. 
China. Today, only 36 percent say the US, while 42 percent believe China is 
in the top position. 
Knowing a fact or trend (China replacing the USA) objectively is one thing, 
but subjective affinity is quite a different thing. Table 2.7 tallies the percentages of 
respondents in each country that have a favorable view of the USA versus a favor-
able view of China. In the 2011 Pew poll, 79 percent of Americans viewed the 
USA favorably, down from 85 percent the year before, whereas only 51 percent 
of Americans viewed China favorably (up by 2 percent on 2010). In contrast, in 
2011 only 44 percent of Chinese viewed the USA favorably (a decline of 14 per-
cent), whereas 95 percent of Chinese viewed China favorably (a slight decline from 
97 percent). This "mirror image" in perception contributes to aggrandizing oneself 
and demonizing the other. More Indians viewed the USA favorably than China (41 
versus 25 percent). Perhaps reflecting their anxiety about the rise ofChina,Japanese 
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TABLE 2.7 Views of USA and China 
US fiwof<lbility China fi1vorability 
2010 2011 Clia11ge 2010 2011 
% % % % 
USA 8S 79 -6 49 S1 
Britain 6S 61 -4 46 S9 
France 73 7S +2 41 Sl 
Germany 63 62 -1 30 34 
Spain 61 64 +3 47 SS 
Lithuania 73 S2 
Poland 74 70 -4 46 Sl 
Russia S7 S6 -1 60 63 
Ukraine 60 63 
Turkey 17 10 -7 20 18 
Egypt 17 20 +3 S2 S7 
Jordan 21 13 -8 S3 44 
Lebanon S2 49 -3 S6 S9 
Palestinian 18 62 
Terr. 
Israel 72 49 
China S8 44 -14 97 9S 
India 41 2S 
Indonesia S9 S4 -s S8 67 
Japan 66 8S +19 26 34 
Pakistan 17 12 -s 8S 82 
Brazil 62 62 0 S2 49 
Mexico S6 S2 -4 39 39 
Kenya 94 83 -11 86 71 
Soune: Compiled from Q3a and Q3c, Pew Research Center (2011: 5). 
Change 
+2 
+13 
+10 
+4 
+8 
+S 
+3 
-2 
+S 
-9 
+3 
-2 
+9 
+8 
-3 
-3 
0 
-1S 
overwhehningly have favorable views on the USA (the year-to-year increase of 
19 percent was significant) but negative views on China. More Europeans viewed 
China favorably, but they were still more likely to view the USA more favorably. 
China wins plaudits among the developing countries in Africa, Southwest Asia, 
and the Middle East. The Pew (2012b) study finds that China's image has slipped 
in several countries over the last year. The percentage of Japanese with a favorable 
opinion of China plummeted from 34 percent to 15 percent. In France, China's 
favorability ratings dropped from 51 percent to 40 percent, and in Britain from 
59 percent to 49 percent.And since last year, Americans have become less disposed 
to rate China positively (51 percent in 2011, 40 percent now) (Pew 2012b). So, it 
is a bit more complicated than simply saying that the 2008 GFC increased China's 
soft power at the expense of the United States.While there is an increasing percep-
tion of China's economic power, China's image has not improved commensurably. 
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TABLE 2.8 Who is the world's leading economic power? 
... 1111d it is?' 
S11y USA Good tlii11g B,1d tlii11:?. S11y Cliii1<1 Good thi11g 
% % % % % 
USA 38 34 2 43 4 
Britain 33 14 14 47 16 
France 42 27 15 47 14 
Germany 22 10 9 48 12 
Spain 37 17 13 49 14 
Lithuania 58 33 3 18 7 
Poland 43 27 4 30 9 
Russia 40 10 12 26 10 
Ukraine 40 16 7 22 9 
Turkey 68 6 52 13 3 
Jordan 34 13 13 44 24 
Lebanon 31 16 9 37 26 
Palestinian 55 17 36 28 21 
Terr. 
Israel 50 36 5 35 14 
China 50 15 21 26 23 
India 38 23 11 14 5 
Indonesia 41 24 11 26 19 
Japan 55 38 10 33 9 
Pakistan 47 6 35 30 28 
Brazil 53 32 18 16 10 
Mexico 65 34 22 15 8 
Kenya 62 52 6 20 18 
S111me: Compiled from Q26, Q27US, and Q27CHI, Pew Rese-arch Center (2011: 18) . 
. \Jl)/es: 
•Based on total sample ... Neither .. I .. DK" not shown. 
Not asked iu Egypt. 
... <111dit is?' 
B,11/ tlii11g 
% 
37 
20 
31 
30 
26 
4 
14 
6 
5 
8 
12 
6 
6 
14 
l 
7 
6 
19 
0 
4 
6 
1 
Table 2.8 asks who is the world's leading economic power - China or the USA -
and whether it is a good thing or bad thing. Thirty-eight percent of Americans say 
the USA is still the world's leading economic power, and these people overwhelm-
ingly say it is a good thing (34 percent). Americans show that they can differentiate 
between facts and feelings. More Americans ( 43 percent) concede that China is the 
world economy's top dog (43 percent), but only 4 percent say that this is a good 
thing, with the rest (37 percent) saying that it is a bad thing. This indicates a lot 
of anxiety and ambivalence about China's rise as an economic power. Chinese are 
more modest: 50 percent of them say the USA is still the leader, but more people 
that think so say that it is a bad rather than a good thing (21 percent versus 15 per-
cent). Twenty-six percent of Chinese say China is already the leader, but most of 
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TABLE 2.9 Countries named as the world's leading economic power 
USA China ]ap.m EU Otl1er I None I DK 
% % % % % 
China 48 29 2 5 15 
USA 40 41 6 5 8 
Britain 28 58 5 3 7 
France 29 57 7 6 0 
Germany 13 62 5 17 3 
Spain 26 57 9 5 3 
Italy 37 46 8 3 6 
Greece 36 45 7 3 10 
Poland 35 35 12 4 13 
Czech Republic 29 51 9 7 5 
Russia 26 33 17 7 18 
Turkey 54 22 6 8 10 
Egypt 40 39 11 7 3 
Jordan 36 44 5 5 12 
Lebanon 34 44 5 5 12 
Tunisia 48 29 7 5 11 
Pakistan 48 27 4 20 
India 37 17 7 1 38 
Japan 45 43 3 5 5 
Brazil 45 27 15 3 10 
Mexico 51 18 12 6 12 
MEDIAN 37 41 7 5 10 
Source: Compiled from Q29, Pew Research Center (2012a: 5). 
these people see this as a good thing. Japan - currently the world's third largest 
economy, having been overtaken by China - again shows nostalgia and doubt. 
More Japanese pick the USA over China as the world's top economic power, and 
those who pick China are more likely to view it as a bad thing. Indians do not seem 
to have fixed views on this issue: although more Indians pick the USA over China, 
large percentages of Indians did not give an opinion. Even among those Europeans 
who are more likely to pick China over the USA (Britain, France, Germany, and 
Spain), they are more likely to feel that China's rise as an economic power is a bad 
thing. 
Table 2.9 provides an update for the question, "Who is the world's leading eco-
nomic power?" (Pew 2012a). In China, 48 percent of respondents named the USA 
as the world's leading economic power, 29 percent named China, and only 2 per-
cent named Japan. In the USA, 41 percent considered China as the world's lead-
ing economic power, and 40 percent picked the USA. Although there are consid-
erable variations in public opinions across the 20 countries polled, overall more 
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TABLE 2.10 How China's growing power affects your country 
Gn>wi11g 111i/it,1ry power Growi11g cc011<>1nic power 
Goodthi11g B,1d tlti11x Good thi11g B,1d t/1i11g 
% % % % 
USA 11 79 37 53 
Britain 13 71 53 22 
France 16 83 41 59 
Germany 12 79 46 50 
Spain 12 74 52 40 
Lithuania 11 62 47 27 
Poland 13 68 32 46 
Russia 12 74 37 41 
Ukraine 12 57 37 33 
Turkey 9 66 13 64 
Jordan 28 52 65 28 
Lebanon 24 57 57 29 
Palestinian Terr. 62 29 66 24 
Israel 19 66 53 30 
India 22 50 29 40 
Indonesia 44 36 62 25 
Japan 7 87 57 35 
Pakistan 72 5 79 5 
Brazil 29 51 53 30 
Mexico 26 55 39 43 
Kenya 62 29 85 12 
So1me: Compiled from Q63 and Q64, Pew Research Cemer (2011: 7) . 
• \/ote: Not asked in Egypt. 
people around the world now view China as the world's leading economic power 
as opposed to the USA ( 41 percent versus 37 percent). 
Table 2.10 asks how China's growing military and economic power affect the 
respondent's country, respectively. Americans (79 percent) overwhelmingly believe 
China's growing military power is a bad thing, whereas the percentage of Americans 
who think China's economic rise is bad is considerably smaller (53 percent). The 
Japanese are even more negative about China's rising military power, because they 
fear it will be directed against them. The Indians are less pessimistic, but even they 
express greater concern about China's growing military power (50 percent) than its 
economic power (40 percent). West Europeans are as guarded as Americans about 
China's rising military power, but seem less concerned about China's rising eco-
nomic power. This question apparently was not asked in China. The Chinese gov-
ermnent blames Western governments for propat,TJting "the China threat" theory. 
However, judging from the popular groundswell of international skepticism about 
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China's military power, it seems that China's own policies, such as lack of transpar-
ency in military spending and doctrines, assertive conduct in the South China Sea, 
and territorial disputes with neighbors, all contribute to the prevalent doubt about 
China's military power as a positive force for international peace. 
The Pew studies (2011, 2012a, and 2012b) show the nearly universal inter-
national recognition of China's rise as a great power, but they also reveal consid-
erable reservation or even skepticism about the rise of China, particularly in the 
military realm. The surveys did not, however, ask people in various countries about 
their perception of the rise of India. 
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Global Views 2010 asks different ques-
tions and sheds additional light. Its Foreign Policy in the New Millennium Study (2012) 
asked many similar questions. Unlike the Pew survey, the Chicago Council studies 
polled only the American general public. Nonetheless, the results show interest-
ing findings in that Americans tend to have different perceptions about the rise of 
China and the rise of India. 
Figure 2.1 shows that Americans realize that the days of unparalleled US domin-
ation in world affairs are coming to an end. The world is moving toward multipo-
larity, as the influence of certain countries, particularly China, in the next 10 years 
is poised to approach that of the USA. The figure also shows the slight decline of 
the EU, the rise of India, and other BRICS, such as Brazil. This figure empirically 
provides the psychological backdrop to the power-transition theory. 
Figure 2.2 shows the influences of the USA and China, as surveyed in the 
Council's 2008 and 2010 polls, with projection to 2020. It confirms the relative 
decline of the USA vis-a-vis China and China's approaching parity as of or soon 
after 2020. 
Figure 2.3 shows the psychological impact of China's rapid ascent.As recently as 
1998, 4 7 percent of Americans said that they considered Japan to be more import-
ant to the USA than China. Barely 12 years later, in 2010, 68 percent of Americans 
considered China to be more important and only 27 percent picked Japan. This 
trend continued.Two years later, the Chicago Council (2012) found that 70 percent 
of Americans consider China to be more important than Japan. 
Although Americans acknowledge China's rise and undisputed and increasing 
importance, they are also concerned about the threat a rising China poses to the 
USA. Such perceptions have gone through cyclical patterns in the past two decades, 
ebbing and flowing in accordance with China's conduct. As Figure 2.4 shows, in 
the mid-1990s, when China behaved assertively in the South China Sea (e.g. the 
MischiefReefrow with the Philippines),American perception of the China threat 
shot up: between 1994 and 2002, 56-57 percent of Americans considered China's 
development as a world power to be a "critical threat" to the vital interests of the 
USA in the next 10 years. The China threat perception dropped to 33 percent in 
2004. However, it picked up again after 2008, as China's newly confident behavior 
again alarmed its neighbors. In the 2010 survey, 43 percent of Americans viewed 
China's rising power as a critical threat to the USA. In the 2012 survey, 40 percent 
of Americans viewed China's rising power as a critical threat to the USA. 
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Figure 2.5 ranks countries Americans consider important to the USA. In 2008, 
the countries Americans thought were very important to the USA were Great 
Britain, Canada, China,Japan, and Saudi Arabia. China was placed only third, with 
52 percent of Americans saying it was important to the USA. In the 2010 survey, 
China catapults to become the most important country to the USA (54 percent 
say "very important"; 87 percent say "very or somewhat important combined"), 
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FIGURE 2.3 Importance of China versus Japan: percentage of people who think that 
Japan or China is more important to the United States than the other in terms of 
American vital interests today 
Source:Adapted from Figure 61, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2010: 64). 
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FIGURE 2.4 Perceived threat of China's rise: percentage of people who see the 
development of China as a world power as a "critical" threat to the vital interest of the 
United States in the next ten years 
Sources: Compiled from Figure 4 7, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2010: 51) and 
Figure 4.6, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2012: 35). 
eclipsing America's traditional allies, such as Britain, Japan, and Canada. India's 
growing importance is also beginning to be acknowledged by Americans, with 
68 percent of Americans saying India is important to the USA- but not as import-
ant as China. 
However, while Americans objectively recognize China's importance, they 
do not necessarily feel affinity toward China. Figure 2.6 provides a different 
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Rank in 2008 Rank in 2010 Rank in 2010 
(very important) (very important) (very and somewhat 
imoortant combincdl 
Great Britain 60 China 54 China 87 
Canada 53 Great Britain 52 Great Britain 86 
China 52 Canada 50 Japan 86 
Japan 45 Janan 40 Canada 84 
Saudi Arabia 44 Israel 33 Germany 77 
Israel 40 Mexico 31 Israel 74 
Mexico 37 Saudi Arabia 30 Saudi Arabia 74 
Russia 34 Germany 27 Russia 74 
Iran 32 lraa 26 Mexico 72 
Pakistan 30 Russia 26 India 68 
Germanv 29 Iran 25 South Korea 67 
India 25 Afohanistan 21 Iraa 63 
Afghanistan 25 South Korea 21 Afghanistan 60 
France 22 Pakistan 19 Iran 59 
Venezuela 16 India 18 Pakistan 59 
Egypt 16 Brazil 10 Brazil 54 
Brazil 14 Turkev IO Turkev 52 
Indonesia 9 Ni12eria 6 Ni11eria 35 
FIGURE 2.5 Rank order of countries as "very important" to the USA in 2008 and 2010 
and as "very" and "somewhat" important combined in 2010 
Source: Adapted from Figure 55, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2010: 59) 
measure - feeling toward countries, with 100 denoting very warm, 0 meaning very 
cold, and 50 indicating neutral. The countries Americans feel the warmest about 
remain America's traditional allies, such as Great Britain (73), Germany (63),Japan 
(61), France, Israel, Brazil, etc. India received a reading of 53. In contrast, China 
received a slightly cold reading at 45. 
Fib'Ure 2.7 shows that Americans, while acknowledging China's increasing 
importance, nonetheless are not certain about the direction of US-China relations. 
Between 2006 and 2010, 47 percent of Americans think that this important bilat-
eral relationship will stay about the same. However, those that say the relationship 
will improve or worsen flipped during those four years. Now only 19 percent of 
Americans think that Sino-American relations will improve. 
Figure 2.8 asks respondents which countries they favor the USA pursuing a free 
trade agreement with. The percentage that says no to China as an FTA partner for 
the USA (56 percent) far exceeds the percentage that says yes. There is greater sup-
port for signing an FTA with India compared to China.Whereas the general public 
may view trade agreements from their own parochial perspective (namely, whether 
free trade agreements with foreign countries mean job losses), the fact that more 
Americans oppose an FTA with China is consistent with the considerable concern 
about China's economic rise as a threat - a finding already mentioned in the Pew 
Research Poll (2011). 
While Americans are clearly ambivalent about the implications of a rising China, 
they are pragmatic. In 2006 49 percent of Americans said that the USA and China 
are mostly rivals, and 41 percent that they are mostly partners. In 2012, 48 percent 
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FIGURE 2.6 Feelings toward countries: mean score on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 
meaning a very warm, favorable feeling; 0 meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling; and 
50 meaning not particularly warm or cold 
Source: Modified from Figure 56, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2010: 60). 
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FIGURE 2.7 Relations with China: percentage of people who think relations with 
China are improving, worsening, or staying about the same 
Source:Adapted from Figure 62, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2010: 64). 
said that they are mostly partners, and 47 that they are mostly rivals (Chicago 
Council 2012).The same study finds that 69 percent think that in dealing with the 
rise of China's power, the USA should undertake friendly cooperation and engage-
ment with China, whereas only 28 percent think the USA should actively work to 
Financial crisis and Asia's changing balance of power 65 
Key: 
CNo •Yes 
-1 
Japan 41! 
India 48 
South Korea 51 
China 56 
Colombia 58 
j -----
0 20 40 60 80 100 
FIGURE 2.8 Free Trade Agreements: percentage of people who say yes or no when 
asked if the United States should have a free trade agreement that would lower barriers 
such as tariffs with the countries listed 
Source: Modified from Figure 26, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2010: 31). 
limit the growth of China's power. The official US policy of engagement toward 
China apparently enjoys wide popular support, whereas a policy of containment, 
advocated by some neorealists, receives little' support. 
In sum, the Chicago Council survey shows that Americans clearly acknowledge 
China's rise to match US power in the near future, but they neither have affin-
ity toward China given its political system nor feel sanguine about China's rise. 
Yet at the same time, they acknowledge the importance of working pragmatically 
with China, given its importance to the USA. Interestingly enough, Americans also 
acknowledge India's rise and seem to have a more benign view on India.This could 
be due to both India's democratic system, which is similar to America's, and India's 
relative greater distance from catching up with the USA (if it ever does), thereby 
posing less of a threat. 
Conclusion 
Judging from the previous discussions, we can conclude that: 
1 The 2008 GFC has clearly closed the resource-power gap between the United 
States and Europe, on the one hand, and China and India, on the other. Trends 
toward parity will continue.The international system has become more multi-
polar than before. This is confirmed by conventional economic analysis. 
2 The 2008 GFC has also closed the soft-power gap between these two groups 
somewhat, as the West's capacity for providing the public good for global com-
mon prosperity is constrained and its reputation tarnished. There have been 
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perceptible and interesting shifts in public perceptions regarding global leader-
ship, particularly the economic power transitions between the USA and China. 
However, the BRICs will not replace the USA in this respect soon. There 
remain considerable expectations for US leadership and sufficient skepticism 
toward China's rise. 
3 However, the 2008 GFC also reveals considerable public unease or anxieties 
in many countries about a potential hegemonic transition. Power has become 
more diffuse. Outcomes may also become more indeterminate. 
What will happen if, in relative terms, China continues to rise and the USA 
continues to decline? Wouldn't the perceived changing power balance as a result of 
a supposedly short-term event (the 2008 GFC) then contribute to a long-term and 
perhaps fundamental shift? Can the USA bounce back from the crisis to such an 
extent that it can resume its erstwhile dominant role in world affairs? Or would it be 
that even a recovered America would find its advantage irrevocably reduced, so that 
a new model of governing the world by the major powers will be needed? Thinking 
about the impact of the 2008 GFC onAsia's changing balance of power helps exam-
ine a core and perennial concept in international relations - power - in a new light. 
Notes 
1 See data in Bordo and Eichengreen (2002). 
2 For a useful summary of the recent economic crises and the regional institutions of 
cooperation that they engendered, see Henning (2011). Bordo and Eichengreen (2002) 
also provide a useful "lessons learned." 
3 Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahatir's outburst on 23 August 1997 was 
indicative:" All these countries have spent forty years to build up their economies and a 
moron like (George) Soros comes along." Quoted in Loh (1997). 
4 Correlates ofWar (COW), National Material Capabilities (v 4.0) dataset, http://corre-
latesofwar.org.Accessed 1 March 2012. 
5 CINC is unsatisfactory also for reasons of validity. One can reasonably question whether 
some of the indicators, such as iron and steel production, may be outdated, since national 
power in the information age relies more on knowledge. Other indicators, such as total 
population, tend to favor states with a large population but fail to consider the quality of 
the population. 
6 Various writers use CNP, but never discuss their methodologies. The author's search 
for Chinese sources often returns with a partial account, such as "China's CNP in 2009 
is-" without specifying a methodology for longitudinal comparisons. Furthermore, the 
data for 2010 and 2020 were projections c. 2000. 
7 Michael Beckley (2011: 12) provides a spirited empirical rebuttal to the "China century" 
thesis Oacques 2009) and argues that the USA will remain the dominant power despite 
China's closing the gap as a result of the 2008 GFC. 
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